Between the lines looks at what matters in Austrian and EU competition law — alongside technology and the practice of lawyering, the topics we care about most. The aim is a genuine perspective, not just commentary, and something worth your time. Feedback is always welcome.
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A merger control proceeding with the Austrian competition authorities runs a bit differently from anywhere else, and if you enter phase 2, the dynamic changes completely to a court-led system. International counsel have described the Austrian system to me as “surprising” and “nerve-wracking”. It should not be, and this post unpacks it.
Read the post →The Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) recently upheld the unconditional clearance of a 4-to-3 merger on the EEA market for couplings for passenger trains (16 Ok 11/25s, 26 January 2026). With combined shares of 42–48%, both applicable presumptions of dominance were formally triggered. Both competition authorities, the Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (Federal Competition Authority, BWB) and the Bundeskartellanwalt (Federal Cartel Prosecutor, BKAnw), applied for prohibition. The parties did not offer commitments. A fact pattern like that usually carries a high risk of prohibition – or at least a price, in the form of commitments. So how was this transaction cleared unconditionally?
